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b Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg, Ammerländer Heerstrasse 114-118, 26129 Oldenburg, Germany
c University of Applied Science Bielefeld, Artilleriestrasse 9a, 32427 Minden, Germanya r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 31 January 2011
Received in revised form
8 March 2012
Accepted 10 March 2012






Transaction cost theory92/$ - see front matter & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. A
x.doi.org/10.1016/j.pursup.2012.03.001
esponding author. Tel.: þ49 5718385209; fa
ail addresses: jost.sieweke@hhu.de (J. Siewek
rg.de (S. Birkner), michael.mohe@fh-bielefelda b s t r a c t
Research has recently provided evidence that at least some companies have involved purchasing
departments in buying professional services such as management consulting services. Some depart-
ments have established preferred supplier programs (PSPs) for consulting services, i.e., programs for
consultancies with whom a company seeks to build up long-term relationships. While there are several
studies that analyze such programs for suppliers of goods, research on business services is limited. Our
aim is to present an exploratory analysis of PSPs for consulting services. Based on a survey of German
client companies, we found that the most important reason for establishing PSPs is to reduce costs and
transaction costs. Furthermore, our findings revealed that companies with and without PSPs for
consulting services apply high significance to relational selection criteria. Moreover, in companies with
PSPs, purchasing departments are more frequently involved in selecting consultancies compared to
companies without PSPs. Finally, we found that companies with and without PSPs do not differ in their
assessment of problems associated with the purchasing of consulting services. The study contributes to
research on the purchasing of consulting services by indicating that the consultant–manager relation-
ship should be extended to a service triad, involving purchasing professionals, managers, and
consultants. Moreover, we contribute to research on PSPs by extending the focus to PSPs for
knowledge-intensive service providers.
& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Recently, researchers have devoted interest to the purchasing of
business services by firms (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2003; Selviaridis et al.,
2011; Selviaridis and Spring, 2010; Sonmez and Moorhouse, 2010;
van der Valk and van Iwaarden, 2011; West, 1997), particularly
management consulting services (e.g., Bäcklund and Werr, 2005;
Dawes et al., 1992; Höner and Mohe, 2009; Lindberg and Furusten,
2005; Mohe, 2005; Werr and Pemer, 2007). The literature has
identified two main approaches regarding the purchasing of con-
sulting services. The first approach is a decentralized one, in which
functional managers decide whether to use consultancies, which
consultancies they hire, and how much of their budget they spend
on consulting services (Höner and Mohe, 2009; Mohe, 2005; Werr
and Pemer, 2005). In the centralized approach, a certain
department—e.g., the purchasing department—is involved in the
procurement of consulting services, for instance in the selection ofll rights reserved.
x: þ49 5718385240.
e), stephanie.birkner@uni-
.de (M. Mohe).consultancies or in supporting managers in contract negotiations
(Werr and Pemer, 2007). Both approaches, however, can also be
combined, resulting in a ‘‘hybrid approach’’ (Werr and Pemer, 2005),
in which some stages in the purchasing process are centralized,
while others are still the responsibility of functional managers.
While the decentralized approach was until now more widely
used by companies, there has recently been a shift to the
centralized approach (Bäcklund and Werr, 2005; Freedman and
Stinson, 2004; Mohe, 2005; Werr and Pemer, 2007). For instance,
several large companies authorize purchasing professionals to
control billing costs and to ensure that service providers are held
responsible for the results of their work (Bäcklund and Werr,
2005; Freedman and Stinson, 2004; Werr and Pemer, 2007).
Moreover, purchasing professionals support managers in buying
processes, from defining the assignment to the evaluation of
service providers (Werr and Pemer, 2007), so that these profes-
sionals are increasingly involved in the buying process.
A measure established by purchasing professionals to reorga-
nize the purchasing of consulting services comes in the form of
preferred supplier programs (PSPs) (Mohe, 2005; Werr and
Pemer, 2007). PSPs are employed for companies’ most important
suppliers, with whom they build long-term relationships for
J. Sieweke et al. / Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management 18 (2012) 123–136124mutual benefit (Dorsch et al., 1998; Halley and Nollet, 2002). Such
programs, for instance, entail special contractual agreements for
buyers and preferred suppliers that secure a close relationship. A
typical characteristic of PSPs for consulting services is centralized
management by purchasing professionals instead of decentraliza-
tion through individual managers (Bäcklund and Werr, 2005;
Werr and Pemer, 2007). However, while PSPs are a fairly common
method of managing relationships with suppliers of goods
(Dorsch et al., 1998; Halley and Nollet, 2002; Ulaga and Eggert,
2006), they represent a new approach with regard to consulting
services.
The practical importance of PSPs for consulting services is not
reflected in the literature so far, since only a few studies have
indicated the presence of PSPs for consulting services (see e.g.,
Bäcklund and Werr, 2005; Werr and Pemer, 2007). These studies,
however, do not analyze PSPs in greater detail, so we know little
about these programs. We argue that there are several reasons
why PSPs for consulting services deserve further attention. First,
companies increasingly establish PSPs for consulting services
(Bäcklund and Werr, 2005; Werr and Pemer, 2007) and these
programs have the potential to significantly impact companies’
purchasing practices (Werr and Pemer, 2007). For instance,
changes in companies’ purchasing practices might influence the
well-studied client–consultant relationship (see e.g., Fincham,
1999; Werr and Styhre, 2002) in that it becomes a service triad
(Choi and Wu, 2009a,b; van der Valk and van Iwaarden, 2011)
involving purchasing professionals, managers, and consultants.
Second, this study also contributes to the purchasing literature in
that we extend research on PSPs. Although previous studies
examined PSPs for suppliers of goods (e.g., Dorsch et al., 1998;
Ruben et al., 2007), our research also provides insights into PSPs
for business services, which are increasingly used by and have a
significant strategic importance for companies (Ellram et al.,
2004). Third, the analysis is further important for companies to
decide whether PSPs for consulting services might be beneficial
for them, e.g., by reducing costs. Therefore, the aim of this article
is to present an exploratory analysis of PSPs for consulting
services based on a survey of large private companies in Germany.
The paper is structured as follows: in the first part, we review
the literature on the purchasing of management consulting
services and PSPs to identify gaps and to develop our research
questions; subsequently, we describe the methodology of our
empirical study and present our findings; and finally, we discuss
our findings, clarify the implications of our study, pinpoint its
limitations, and describe possibilities for future research.2. Literature review
Given that the empirical research on the purchasing of con-
sulting services is in an early stage, we conducted a comprehen-
sive literature review to analyze two broad research lines:
(1) preferred supplier programmes and (2) the purchasing of
consulting services. For both, we included articles published
between 1992 and 2011. We used key words to identify relevant
articles and searched in three electronic databases, Business
Source Premier, EconLit and Web of Science.
Our first search identified articles that had the key words
‘‘preferred suppliern’’ in their title, abstract or key words. We
excluded all duplicates and read each article to analyze whether
the article dealt substantially with preferred suppliers. Articles
that were classified as only marginally discussing preferred
suppliers (e.g., mentioning PSPs only once) were excluded. We
finally came up with a total of 13 articles for further analysis.
As key words for our second search, we used ‘‘management
consultn’’ plus ‘‘purchasen’’ or ‘‘procurement’’. After againexcluding duplicate and irrelevant articles (e.g., consultancies
were mentioned only once during the text), we came up with
ten articles. Since our study aims to make a contribution to the
literature on the purchasing of consulting services, we addition-
ally searched the abstracts of all articles that cited the identified
articles and included articles that dealt with the purchasing of
management consulting services to identify additional articles.
Moreover, we expanded our search to edited books on manage-
ment consulting that have been frequently cited in the analyzed
articles (Clark and Fincham, 2002; Furusten and Werr, 2005;
Kipping and Engwall, 2002). We identified five additional articles,
supplying a total of 15 articles.
2.1. Preferred supplier programs
Although we identified only a few studies that focused on
preferred suppliers, we extracted some important insights, which
are summarized in Table 1.
In the first step, we analyzed key characteristics of preferred
suppliers mentioned in the literature. A frequently mentioned
characteristic of preferred suppliers is their significant impor-
tance for buying companies (Dorsch et al., 1998; Ruben et al.,
2007). For instance, preferred supplier status is granted to
suppliers that meet high quality standards (Dorsch et al., 1998;
Ruben et al., 2007) and that produce high-quality products
(Halley and Nollet, 2002; Noonan and Wallace, 2004). Further-
more, the literature found that an additional characteristic of
preferred supplier relationships is the long-term relationship
between buyer and supplier (Crewe and Davenport, 1992;
Dorsch et al., 1998; Druker and Stanworth, 2001), which is likely
the result of the high strategic importance of (preferred) suppliers
for buyers.
Regarding companies’ reasons for establishing PSPs, the litera-
ture argues that one of the most important reasons is that
companies seek to reduce the number of business contacts to a
reasonable few by focusing on a limited number of preferred
suppliers (Dorsch et al., 1998). Moreover, it is also argued that
PSPs are established because of a shift in focus from product price
to product quality (Crewe and Davenport, 1992; Ulaga and Eggert,
2006). For instance, Ruben et al. (2007) found that supermarkets
looked for a selective group of suppliers that were able to
guarantee the delivery of products and granted them the status
of preferred supplier, since customers put greater emphasis on
product quality and safety and less emphasis on price.
Another advantage of having established PSPs is a reduction in
transaction costs, which comprise all costs incurred in economic
exchanges (Williamson, 1985). Transaction costs are distin-
guished in costs that occur before (ex ante) and after (ex post)
transactions. Examples for ex ante transaction costs are search
and information costs (e.g., searching for suppliers or collecting
information about prices) as well as bargaining costs (e.g.,
specifying contracts), while ex post transaction costs are, for
instance, policing and enforcement costs such as controlling
transaction partners (Dahlman, 1979). According to Williamson
(1981), the level of transaction costs depends (1) on the uncer-
tainty of the transaction, (2) how often a transaction has recurred,
and (3) the degree of transaction-specific investments required. A
goal of transaction cost theory is to specify under which condi-
tions it is beneficial for companies to manage transactions
internally or externally—i.e., by purchasing goods or services
from suppliers. The literature argues that PSPs significantly
reduce transaction costs. For instance, by reducing the number
of suppliers, buying companies significantly reduce transaction
costs (Ruben et al., 2007)—for instance, search and information
costs. Moreover, since buyers have experience with their pre-
ferred suppliers and have gathered information about them,
Table 1
Studies dealing with preferred suppliers or preferred supplier programmes.






Cox et al. (2005) The aim of the article is to provide evidence
about sourcing strategies for indirect spend.






The paper analyses the changing relationships
between clothing manufacturers and retailers.
Suppliers with whom the
buyer has long term, close
working relationships
Greater emphasize on product
quality and less emphasize on
price
–
Dorsch et al. (1998) The study aims to document the existence of the
vendor stratification concept by examining the
differences in the relationship quality that
customers perceive to exist between their
approved vendors.
Suppliers with whom a
company has long-term
relationships
To reduce the number of





The paper examines the relationship between
private recruitment bureaus and their clients,
with particular attention to the recruitment and
selection of temporary workers.




Gosling et al. (2010) The paper examines how buyers can configure
their supply networks to achieve supply chain
flexibility.
– – Advantages: reduced





The study analyses the contribution of preferred
suppliers to a buying organization’s supply
chain.
Suppliers that are better able
to offer a renewed product of
improved quality at an
advantageous price and with
whom a company has long-
term relationships








The study integrates previous work regarding
service and product quality to develop and
demonstrate tools useful in evaluating total
product quality.
– Quality demands –
Hurkens et al. (2006) The paper presents the results of a study
conducted at a leading vehicle glass repair and
replacement organization regarding the trade-
offs to be made when developing a strategically




The paper describes the development of a
diagnostic instrument for contract
manufacturers to align core competencies to
developing value criteria.




Parry et al. (2006) The paper assesses the applicability of supplier
models by Cox and Kraljic that link relationship
types to core competence.
Suppliers that are judged to
be the best at providing
complementary goods or
services of medium asset
specificity, but low strategic




The study investigates an online market for IT
services to see if in this market setting, added
value from a portfolio approach can still be
found.
Suppliers who get the largest
proportion of buyer’s business
in terms of the number of
projects compared with other
suppliers.
– –
Ruben et al. (2007) The paper analyses the conditions that motivate
Asian supermarkets’ choices for vegetable
sourcing through wholesale procurement or
preferred supplier systems.
– Consumers put greater
emphasize on product quality
so that buyers look for a
selective group of suppliers
that are able to guarantee the
delivery of these products
Advantages: preferred
supplier arrangements save
on governance costs and










The paper investigates avenues for
differentiation through value creation in
business-to-business relationships.
– – –
J. Sieweke et al. / Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management 18 (2012) 123–136 125contracting becomes less risky and buyers’ uncertainties about
supplier quality are reduced (Gosling et al., 2010). Furthermore,
PSPs reduce the risk of opportunistic behavior by suppliers, which
reduces buyers’ governance costs and perceived risk in the
transaction (Ruben et al., 2007). On the other hand, a significant
disadvantage of PSPs is that they do not necessarily save real costs(Ruben et al., 2007), for instance compared to wholesale purchase,
in which buyers frequently change their suppliers to buy at the
lowest price. Furthermore, Halley and Nollet (2002) found that
preferred suppliers often do not contribute as much as expected
to a company’s supply chain, since there can be problems in
selecting the right preferred suppliers.
J. Sieweke et al. / Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management 18 (2012) 123–1361262.2. Purchasing consulting services
Referring the purchasing of consulting services we classified
the reviewed articles into three broad categories: (1) reasons for
purchasing management consulting services, (2) criteria used to
select management consultancies and (3) formalization of the
consulting process. Table 2 summarizes the main facts of the
analyzed studies and describes their methodology and sample.
Regarding the first category, researchers identified different reasons
for purchasing management consulting services. On the one hand,
these reasons relate to economic rationality, meaning that clients
purchase consulting services to gain access to knowledge, which helps
them to increase their profits (Iyer et al., 2006; Richter and Niewiem,
2009; Soriano, 2004). On the other hand, Furusten (2009) showed that
clients purchase consulting services to help clients reduce the uncer-
tainty they experience. Therefore, he argued that consultants represent
‘agents of stability’ rather than ‘agents of change’.
Most articles, however, focused on clients’ criteria when
selecting consulting services. As clients have difficulty assessing
consultants’ qualities because of the intangibility of the service
and the lack of a codified body of knowledge, research revealed
that clients’ most important selection criteria include personal
experiences with consultants, consultants’ reputations, and per-
sonal trust in consultants’ qualities (Corcoran and McLean, 1998;
Dawes et al., 1992; Glückler, 2005). In line with Glückler and
Armbrüster’s (2003) findings on the lack of institutional trust
(e.g., consultants need no formal qualification to call themselves
‘‘consultants’’), clients rely on quality substitutes such as personal
experiences or recommendations to select qualified consultants.
The third category focuses on companies which formalize their
purchasing of consulting services. Research showed that compa-
nies seek this approach by centralizing the purchasing processes,
e.g., purchasing departments or purchasing professionals manage
the purchasing of consulting services (Bäcklund and Werr, 2005;
Werr and Pemer, 2007). As Bäcklund and Werr (2005) argued, by
centralizing the purchasing process, companies aim to break the
personal ties between managers and consultants. Furthermore,
they argued that PSPs for consulting services are one measure to
reach this goal and that PSPs might act as governance mechan-
isms, whose aim is to control managers and consultants by
establishing a corporate relationship (i.e. between the client
company and a management consultancy), as opposed to a
personal relationship (i.e. between an individual manager and a
consultant). Similarly, Werr and Pemer (2007) observed an
increased involvement of purchasing professionals in the procure-
ment of consultants, which results in the establishment of PSPs for
consulting services. These PSPs for consulting services comprise
measures such as master agreements with the preferred consul-
tancies or reducing the number of consultancies to a smaller
selection available to managers. However, Höner and Mohe (2009)
revealed in their case study on a German client company that
managers may try to bypass the company’s purchasing procedures
to work with the managers’ preferred consultants. Similarly,
Lindberg and Furusten (2005) found that managers deliberately
ignore governmental rules that would break the personal ties
between managers and consultants to purchase the services of
their preferred consultants. These studies indicate the efforts of
some companies to centralize the purchasing of consulting ser-
vices, but for several reasons managers try to bypass these rules.
2.3. Research questions
Our review of the literature on PSPs and on the purchasing of
consulting services revealed that although PSPs for management
consulting services have already been identified by researchers
(Bäcklund and Werr, 2005; Werr and Pemer, 2007), detailedanalyses have so far been missing. However, the literature on
PSPs reveals that these programs can have a significant influence
on buyers’ performance and their relationships with suppliers.
Therefore, we argue that research on consulting services, parti-
cularly the literature on the purchasing of consulting services,
would benefit from a detailed analysis of PSPs for consulting
services. Particularly, our exploratory study focuses on four
research questions:1. Why have companies (not) established PSPs for consulting
services?2. Do companies with PSPs for consulting services differ from
companies without this mechanism regarding their selection
criteria for consultancies?3. Do companies with and without PSPs for consulting services
differ in their centralization of the purchasing of consulting
services?4. Do companies with and without PSPs for consulting services
differ in their assessment of problems associated with the
purchasing of consulting services?
Our first research question aims at reducing a significant gap
in the literature. Although some authors have argued that buyers
establish PSPs to strengthen ties with their suppliers (e.g. Dorsch
et al., 1998) or to reduce transaction costs (Ruben et al., 2007),
these assumptions lack empirical analysis, since there are few
studies that directly ask companies for their reasons for (not)
establishing PSPs, particularly for consulting services. Therefore,
this research question pinpoints which factors influence decisions
about the establishment of PSPs for consulting services. This
analysis is important for research on PSPs for consulting services
in order to investigate whether transaction cost considerations
are indeed the main driver for the establishment of such pro-
grams, as argued by previous studies (see e.g., Ruben et al., 2007).
Our second research question derives from literature focused
on selection criteria for consultancies (e.g., Bennett and Smith,
2004; Dawes et al., 1992; Glückler and Armbrüster, 2003). While
these studies provide evidence that relational criteria such as
personal relationships and prior experiences with consultants are
among clients’ most important selection criteria, thus far no study
has investigated whether these criteria differ among companies
that have already established PSPs for consulting services. Recal-
ling the findings of Werr and Pemer (2007), we might expect that
companies with PSPs attach more significance to economic
selection criteria, while companies without PSPs might still use
relational criteria. This analysis is important for the literature on
the purchasing of consulting services in order to gain insights into
how PSPs for consulting services impact the purchasing of such
services, in this case the significance of selection criteria.
Our third research question provides insights into companies’
(de)centralization of the purchasing process, which refers to the
entire purchasing process, from defining the contract assignments
and selecting qualified consultancies to evaluating the service.
This analysis investigates whether companies with PSPs for
consulting services tend to centralize their purchasing of consult-
ing services as compared to companies without such PSPs. The
analysis reduces a significant gap in the literature on the purchas-
ing of consulting services. While prior studies indicated that
companies might differ in their degree of centralizing the pur-
chasing of consulting services (Werr and Pemer, 2005), we do not
know which parts are managed centrally or decentrally. Reducing
this gap contributes to growing research on purchasing centrali-
zation, both in general (Karjalainen, 2011) and with regard to
consulting services (Werr and Pemer, 2007).
Our fourth research question is motivated by the literature
pinpointing problems that purchasing professionals and other
Table 2
Studies dealing with the purchasing of management consulting services.
Author(s) Topic Method Countries Sample Participants Findings
Bäcklund and Werr
(2005)








Top 20 largest Swedish
companies
More formal handling of consultants (strategies:
collaboration and competition) involve severe




Comparison of the use of legal contract
and personal trust for the relationships
between clients and providers of
business advice
Survey UK 210 questionnaires Clients Consultants are predominantly governed by a mixture of
contract relations with trust relations, while about one-
fifth of clients solely rely on personal trust.
Brotheridge and Power
(2007)
Developing criteria to guide
management teams in the purchasing
of consulting services
– – – – To maximize the benefits of using consultants, clients
must precisely define what they expect from consultants
and remain objective in evaluating the proposed program.
Corcoran and McLean
(1998)
Selection criteria for management
consultants in public sector




Clients in the public sector find it rather easy to assess
consultants and their work.
Dawes et al. (1992) Selection criteria for management
consultants
Survey Australia 253 questionnaires Unknown Reputation, personal ties and experiences are the main
selection criteria.
Furusten (2009) Analysis of buyers’ and sellers’
description of what management
consulting represents
Interview Sweden 16 interviews Clients and consultants Management consultants play the role of improvisers and
thereby help clients reduce the uncertainty they
experience.
Glückler (2005) Examination of the key mechanisms of








Consultants Personal trust and reputation have been identified as key
mechanisms of foreign market entry, while price
considerations are less important.
Glückler and
Armbruster (2003)




Germany unknown – Public reputation, experience-based trust, networked
reputation and competitive price are the most critical
choice criteria for clients.
Höner and Mohe
(2009)
Analysis of barriers that impede the




Germany 12 interviews and
143 questionnaires
Managers in a client company As barriers that impede the formalization and
centralization of the purchasing of consultants, the study
identified managers’ departmentalism, authority
protection and laziness.
Iyer et al. (2006) Analysis of whether procurement of





USA 284 companies – Clients purchase consulting services to develop
organizational capabilities they lack.
Lindberg and Furusten
(2005)
Analysis of the purchasing process in
public sector organizations
Interview Sweden 25 interviews Clients and consultants Public procurement act is treated as voluntary standard;
practice is governed by norms like informal inquiries and
contracts (i.e. close personal relations and trust)
Richter and Niewiem
(2009)
Analysis of the relationship between
the knowledge requirements of projects
and clients’ decisions to procure
management consultants
Interview Germany 41 interviews
covering 86
projects
Clients The findings provide evidence for a close client–
consultant relationship. Furthermore, clients use the
services of management consultants to procure functional
or industry-specific knowledge.
Rusten et al. (2005) Impact of distance on the selection of
management consultants
Case study Norway 3 case studies of
client companies
Clients and consultants Purchasing of dislocated expertise to maintain social
distance from the firm’s local milieu.
Soriano (2004) Analysis of clients’ reasons for
purchasing management consultants
Survey Spain 108 questionnaires Clients While clients in public companies used consultants to
obtain as many votes as possible, clients in private firms












Purchasing professionals Purchasing professionals are only, to a small part,
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sulting services experience when purchasing consulting services
(see e.g., Engwall and Eriksson, 2005; Ernst and Kieser, 2002;
Glückler and Armbrüster, 2003; Sharma, 1997). For instance, we
analyze whether purchasers of consulting services in companies
with and without PSPs for consulting services differ in their
assessment of problems connected to the selection of manage-
ment consultancies. This analysis is important for managerial
practice, since it indicates whether PSPs might support managers
in the difficult task of purchasing consulting services (Smeltzer
and Ogden, 2002).3. Methods
3.1. Data collection
Since PSPs for consulting services have been largely neglected
in the purchasing literature, we conducted an explorative study
among the 500 largest private sector companies in Germany. We
focused on the top 500 private sector companies in Germany for
two reasons: First, previous studies indicated that heavy users of
consulting services might be more likely to establish PSPs for
consulting services than light users (Werr and Pemer, 2007). Since
we expected a positive correlation between company size and
consulting expenditures, we set our focus on larger companies.
Second, we conducted our research in Germany, since industry
information indicated that the German consulting market is the
largest in Europe (FEACO, 2010), so that it is likely that the
companies are rather heavy users of consulting services. We used
the survey method in order to compare Werr and Pemer’s (2007)
findings from qualitative case studies with findings from a large
scale survey in order to analyze to what extend their findings are
generalizable to the wider population of private companies.
To identify the population we drew on data provided by the
Hoppenstedt database (2008), a large German provider of com-
pany information. This database includes rankings of the largest
companies in Germany according to turnover and number of
employees. We devised a new ranking system, weighing turnover
and number of employees equally in order to obtain a balanced
sample of companies from both capital-intensive and labor-
intensive industries. On the basis of our modified scoring system,
we compiled a new list of the 500 largest companies in Germany,
which we proceeded to contact.
To gather our data, we used a web-based survey communicated
to the selected companies by email. Web-based surveys have a
number of advantages: first, managers usually have access to their
email accounts from any location, so they can complete question-
naires whenever and wherever they wish. Second, such surveys are
quicker to process and cost less than surveys forwarded by
conventional post, especially when samples are large (Cook et al.,
2000). Third, it is possible to individualize the questionnaire (e.g.,Table 3












o1.5 82 (16.4) 13 (21.3) o5000 111
1.6 to 2.5 156 (31.2) 9 (14.8) 5001–10,000 148
2.6 to 5.0 113 (22.6) 11 (18.0) 10,001–20,000 114
5.1 to 15.0 83 (16.6) 12 (19.7) 20,001–35,000 54
15.1 to 40.0 34 (6.8) 6 (9.8) 35,001–50,000 28
40.1 to 75.0 15 (3.0) 5 (8.2) 50,001–100,000 31
475.0 17 (3.4) 5 (8.2) o100,001 14giving respondents the option of skipping follow-up questions) by
programming responding paths in a user-friendly way (Fricker and
Schonlau, 2002). At the same time, web-based surveys also have
certain disadvantages, such as potentially lower response rates
(Cook et al., 2000) or a greater rate of incomplete results compared
to posted surveys (Bachmann et al., 1996). In order to minimize
these disadvantages, we followed the recommendations offered in
the literature such as having pre-contacts with the respondents
(Cook et al., 2000) and personalizing e-mail correspondence (Cook
et al., 2000; Heerwegh, 2005; Heerwegh et al., 2005), which
significantly increase web-based survey response rates.
Before contacting the companies, we ran a pre-test with
practitioners working either in the purchasing department of a
large German company or having several years of experience in
dealing with management consultancies as well as with scholars
specialized in management consulting services to ensure the
reliability of our survey. On the basis of their responses, we
rephrased questions and items to improve clarity and eliminate
misunderstandings. After revising the questionnaire, we called
each company included in our sample to identify a contact person
who was involved in the company’s dealings with management
consultancies or, in the absence of such a person, a manager in the
purchasing department, since previous research has shown that
purchasing departments have a good understanding of the pro-
cess of purchasing management consultant services, even if the
department is not directly involved in that process (Werr and
Pemer, 2007). Subsequently, we contacted the contact persons
personally to outline the purpose and the procedure of our web-
based survey. At this stage, 91 contact persons declined our
invitation to participate in the study. Most of those (85.7%)
referred to a general company policy of rejecting any invitation
to participate in a survey. Others (7.7%) refused because of an
unmanageable number of requests to participate in surveys and
6.6% because of the sensitivity of the subject. Following these
phone calls, we sent personalized emails to the remaining 409
participants. A total of 79 companies stated that they either have
not used any management consulting services recently (17.7%) or
that questions on the use of management consulting services are
handled by their parent company (82.3%). Consequently, we
excluded these companies from our sample and sent two remin-
der emails, each about one week after the last contact date, to the
remaining 330 companies. We received a total of 61 completed
surveys (response rate: 18.5%). However, since the respondents,
in some cases, selected not to answer a particular question, we
report a smaller sample for some items. Although 61 responses
are regarded as too few for more sophisticated statistical analysis
such as regression analysis (Bartlett II et al., 2001), we argue that
the low total number of responses does not limit our analysis,
since our study is more interested in gaining information about
PSPs for consulting services than in testing hypotheses.
Table 3 presents our sample according to number of employ-




Type of industry Respondents
(in %)
(22.2) 11 (18.0) Banking and insurance 12 (19.7)
(29.6) 18 (29.5) Mechanical engineering 8 (13.1)
(22.8) 16 (26.2) Telecommunication 6 (9.8)
(10.8) 3 (4.9) Energy 5 (8.2)
(5.6) 3 (4.9) Pharmaceuticals 5 (8.2)
(6.2) 6 (9.8) Consumer goods 4 (6.6)
(2.8) 4 (6.6) Others 21 (34.4)
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turnover and number of employees, we were able to test for non-
response bias by comparing companies that responded our survey
(including the 79 companies of the sample being unable to
answer our questionnaire) with those who do not by means of
chi-square test (a¼ .05). Our findings indicate a response bias
with regard to turnover (w2¼21.658; p¼ .001) with larger com-
panies responding more frequently than smaller companies,
while a response bias with regard to the number of employees
could not be identified (w2¼7.432; p¼ .283). We argue that the
bias regarding turnover is possibly the result of higher interest in
the topic (purchasing of consulting services), since companies
with higher turnovers are said to be more frequent users of
consulting services (Mohe, 2005; Werr and Pemer, 2007).3.2. Measures
The items used in the survey are mostly based on previous
research in the field of management consulting (a list of all items
can be found in Appendix A). This section is structured following
our research questions.
Companies’ reasons for using PSPs for professional service firms
were measured on a seven-point Likert scale. Items were based on
findings from previous studies (Bäcklund and Werr, 2005; Werr
and Pemer, 2007), which identified reasons such as lowering
costs, reducing the influence of personal relations between
managers and consultants in the selection process as well as
positive experiences in other departments. Examples for items
include ‘We expect a reduction of consulting costs’ and ‘We aimed
to ensure that personal relations between managers and con-
sultants would no longer influence the selection’.
Companies’ reasons for not using PSPs for professional service
firms were also measured on a seven-point Likert scale. We based
items on findings from Werr and Pemer (2007) and Höner and
Mohe (2009), who reported the most important reasons for not
using PSPs for consulting services as: (1) companies’ consulting
expenditures did not justify such programmes, (2) the costs of a
pool are too high, (3) managers insist on budget autonomy,
(4) managers insist on involvement in the selection process and
(5) managers also insist on involvement in identifying the future
demand for consultants. Examples of items included ‘The expen-
ditures on consulting services do not justify such programmes’
and ‘Management insists on its autonomy with regard to the
purchase and use of consultants within their budget’.
We based selection criteria measures on the studies we identi-
fied in our literature review in section 2. We selected the four
highest rated criteria in the study by Dawes et al. (1992).
Additionally, we included Glückler and Armbrüster’s (2003) con-
cept of network reputation and based one item on Corcoran and
McLean’s (1998) findings regarding the importance of ‘value for
money’ for the purchasing of consulting services. Examples for
items included ‘Positive experience from former projects’ and
‘Price/performance ratio’. All items were measured on a seven-
point Likert scale.
To analyze the (de)centralization of the purchasing processes,
companies had to indicate which parts of the purchasing process
were centralized (i.e., a particular department within the com-
pany has responsibility for dealing with consultancies) or decen-
tralized (i.e., individual managers have responsibility for dealing
with consultancies). We distinguished seven parts of the purchas-
ing process (definition of the contract assignment, selection of
qualified consultancies, contract negotiation, project steering,
project documentation, project evaluation, and coordinating con-
sulting projects within the company) based on the discussion of
Kubr (2002).Finally, respondents had to indicate their assessment of
problems in the purchasing process, which we identified on the
basis of a review of consulting literature (e.g., Clark and Salaman,
1998; Ernst and Kieser, 2002; Höner and Mohe, 2009; Mohe,
2005). The problems refer to practices in the purchasing of
consulting services. For instance, respondents indicated the level
of difficulty they experienced in the ‘‘selection of qualified
consultancies’’ or ‘‘contract negotiations’’ with consultancies. All
items were measured on a seven-point Likert scale.
3.3. Data analysis
In order to answer our research questions, we performed
several statistical analyses using SPSS 15.0 for Windows. As
regards our first research question, we used descriptive statistics,
means and standard deviations, in order to analyze companies’
reasons for (not) installing PSPs for management consulting
services.
Our second research question was analyzed by means of the
Mann–Whitney test as well as contingency table. The Mann–
Whitney test was used to analyze differences in the attached
significance of selection criteria. We decided to use the non-
parametric test, since the data were not normally distributed,
which is a necessary condition for applying parametric tests such
as t-test. Ratings of companies with PSPs for consulting services
were compared with those of companies without PSPs in order to
detect significant differences.
To analyze the third research question, we applied contin-
gency table. In the columns, we distinguished between companies
with and without PSPs, while in the rows we distinguished
between companies with centralized and decentralized
approaches. We performed a chi-square (w2) calculation to test
for significant differences between the two kinds of companies.
The fourth research question was analyzed by applying t-tests
that control for differences among companies with and without
PSPs for professional service firms regarding their attached sig-
nificance to problems when dealing with management consul-
tancies. A parametric test was applied, since the data were
normally distributed.
3.4. Results
Regarding the use of PSPs for professional services, our data
revealed that 43.7% of the companies have already established
PSPs for consulting services and 1.4% plan to do so, while 54.9%
have not and do not plan to do so. Each PSP addressed a
maximum of 150 and a minimum of 3 consultancies. The mean
size of this pool was 17 consultancies (SD 31.20), and the median
was 8. The high standard deviation indicated that while some
companies limited their PSPs for consulting services to a smaller
number of consultancies, others still allow their managers to
select among a relatively high number of consultancies. However,
this finding is probably the result of differences in company size;
while the company with a pool of 150 consultancies has a
turnover of between h75 billion and h100 billion, the company
with a pool of just 3 consultancies has a turnover of between
1.6 and 2.5 billion Euros. Hence, it is very likely that a company
with higher turnover is a more frequent user of consulting
services and also normally contracts with a higher number of
consultancies.
Relating to our research question about companies’ reasons for
establishing PSPs for consulting services, our data revealed that
the main reasons are expected reductions in consulting costs
(mean 5.11; SD 1.695) and positive experiences with such
programs in other departments (mean 5.07; SD 1.245) (Table 4).
Reducing the influence of personal relations between managers
Table 4
Clients’ reasons for and against using preferred supplier programmes (PSPs).
Mean (s.d.)
Reasons for using preferred supplier programmes
Lowering costs 5.11 (1.695)
Positive experiences in other departments 5.07 (1.245)
Personal relations between managers and consultants should not influence the selection of consultancies 4.63 (1.944)
Reasons against using preferred supplier programmes
The coordination and maintenance of a pool of preferred suppliers are too expensive 6.03 (.984)
The expenditures on consulting services are not high enough 5.94 (1.390)
Management insists on its autonomy with regard to the purchase and use of consultants within their budget 4.53 (1.958)
Management insists on participating in identifying the future demand for management consultants 4.19 (1.851)
Management insists on its involvement in the selection process of ‘‘their’’ consultants 3.91 (2.021)
Table 5
Mann–Whitney test for differences in the applied selection criteria.




Recommendation by a third person PSP 22 29.64 .128 .898
No PSP 37 30.22
Personal relation to the consultancy PSP 23 30.15  .439 .661
No PSP 34 28.22
Reputation of the consultancy PSP 23 30.78  .483 .629
No PSP 35 28.66
Formal criteria
Price/performance ratio PSP 23 26.76 1.029 .303
No PSP 35 31.30
Industry expertise of the consultancy PSP 24 30.60  .039 .969
No PSP 36 30.43
Positive experiences from former projects PSP 24 29.35 .614 .539
No PSP 37 32.07
Table 6
Cross-tabulation for centralized and decentralized approaches (two-tailed test;
np o .05).
Activities v2 df
Definition of contract assignment .379 1
Selection of qualified consultancies 4.260n 1
Contract negotiation 1.192 1
Project steering .191 1
Project documentation 2.204 1
Project evaluation 1.222 1
Integrating employees in consulting projects .120 1
Coordinating consulting projects within the company 4.616n 1
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reason (mean 4.63; SD 1.944). Companies without PSPs for
consulting services stated that their main reasons for not estab-
lishing such programs were the high coordination and mainte-
nance costs of pools (mean 6.03; SD.984) and the fact that
consulting services expenditures did not justify such programs
(mean 5.94; SD 1.390).
Our second research question asked if the usage of PSPs
influences the purchasing of consulting services with regard to
(1) selection criteria and (2) the decentralization of stages in the
purchasing process. The Mann–Whitney test found no significant
difference between companies with or without PSPs for consult-
ing services regarding the six selection criteria (Table 5).
Regarding the (de)centralization of the purchasing of consult-
ing services, we found few differences between companies with
and without PSPs. Only the selection of management consultan-
cies (w2¼4.26; po .05) and the coordination of consulting pro-
jects (w2¼4.616; po .05) are significantly more frequently
centralized in companies with PSPs for consulting services,
compared with companies without PSPs, while no difference
could be identified between the two types of companies with
regard to the five remaining aspects (Table 6).
Finally, we analyzed whether purchasers in companies with
and without PSPs for consulting services differ in their assessment
of problems associated with the purchasing of consulting services
(Table 7). As the data indicate, only one case occurred—the
coordination of consulting projects—in which companies with
PSPs for consulting services differed significantly from companies
that have not established such programs (t¼2.388; df ¼58;
po .05); as the mean value reveals, purchasers in companies with
PSPs attach a higher significance to that problem compared to
purchasers in companies without PSPs.4. Discussion
4.1. Companies’ reasons for (not) establishing PSPs for consulting
services
First, we analyzed why companies have (not) established PSPs
for consulting services. Our findings show that companies’ most
important reasons for establishing PSPs for consulting services are
related to cost considerations. Companies’ focus on costs indicates
a significant change in their dealing with consultancies, since
prior research found that cost was not an important criterion for
selecting consultancies (see e.g., Dawes et al., 1992; Glückler and
Armbrüster, 2003). However, in the course of globalization, cost
pressures have grown, so companies analyze each cost pool for
possible savings (Ellram, 1996; Weber et al., 2010). An important
reason why consulting services have been excluded from such
considerations in the past was that company spending on them
was rather low (Werr and Pemer, 2007). However, they have
become a significant cost factor for companies nowadays (Mohe,
2005). By establishing PSPs for consulting services, companies
seek to realize potential for saving costs, such as reducing
consultancies’ daily rates, as well as for economies of scale and
learning processes (Karjalainen, 2011).
Proposition 1. The higher a company’s cost pressures, the more
likely is the establishment of PSPs for consulting services.
Besides saving real costs, PSPs for consulting services might
also reduce companies’ transaction costs when dealing with
consultancies (Gosling et al., 2010; Ruben et al., 2007). In the
case of consulting services, transaction costs are particularly high
for several reasons: First, there are significant ex ante transaction
costs incurred in the purchasing of consulting services, since it is
difficult for purchasers to assess consultancies’ quality and
performance ex ante because of the intangibility of the service
(e.g., Clark and Salaman, 1998; Sharma, 1997; Smeltzer and
Ogden, 2002). Second, the lack of formal institutions such as
Table 7
t-Test results for the assessment of problems by companies with and without preferred supplier programmes (two-tailed test,
*po .05).
Problems when dealing with consultancies N Mean T Df
Definition of contract assignment Companies with PSPs 24 5.42 .753 58
Companies without PSPs 36 5.11
Selection of qualified consultancies Companies with PSPs 24 5.46  .843 58
Companies without PSPs 36 5.81
Contract negotiation Companies with PSPs 23 5.17 .281 57
Companies without PSPs 36 5.03
Project steering Companies with PSPs 24 5.08 .857 58
Companies without PSPs 36 4.78
Project evaluation Companies with PSPs 24 5.17 .753 57
Companies without PSPs 35 4.89
Coordinating consulting projects within the company Companies with PSPs 24 5.04 2.388n 58
Companies without PSPs 36 4.00
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industry further increases clients’ uncertainty and perceived risk
when purchasing consulting services (Glückler and Armbrüster,
2003). Third, ex post transaction costs might also be high for
consulting services, since companies might fear opportunistic
behavior from consultants and company managers (Fincham,
2003; Höner and Mohe, 2009), which increases control costs.
PSPs for consulting services might significantly reduce these
transaction costs. First, they reduce ex ante transaction costs
involved in searching for qualified consultancies over the long
term. Although the initial selection of consultancies for PSPs is
likely to be accompanied by high transaction costs (e.g., costs to
gather information about consultancies or costs related to the
bargaining of contracts), they amortize over the years, since each
additional selection and contract negotiation with preferred
consultancies incurs lower transaction costs (Langlois, 1992;
Williamson, 1981). Second, PSPs for consulting services might
also reduce ex post transaction costs by reducing companies’ risk
of opportunistic behavior (Höner and Mohe, 2009). Research
revealed that the manager–consultant relationship is susceptible
to opportunistic behavior to the detriment of the company (Höner
and Mohe, 2009; Werr and Styhre, 2002). For instance, managers
select consultants who promote managers’ careers, and consul-
tants might feel more committed to managers than to the client
company (Karjalainen and van Raaij, 2011; Werr and Styhre,
2002). Furthermore, it is likely that trusting relationships
between purchasing professionals and consultants might emerge
because of their continuous interactions (Williamson, 1993),
which further reduces transaction costs. Additionally, PSPs might
also reduce transaction costs related to companies’ needs for
governing suppliers. ‘‘Preferred consultancies’’ have an incentive
to invest significant efforts in consulting projects, since high
performance guarantees continuous projects and profits, while
poor performance might lead to loss of their preferred supplier
status.
Proposition 2. In the long run, the establishment of PSPs reduces
companies’ transaction costs related to purchasing and dealing with
consultancies.
However, our findings indicated that cost considerations are
also the most important reason for not establishing PSPs for
consulting services. We explain this finding with costs that are
related to establishing PSPs for consulting services. A pool of
preferred consultancies incurs significant expenditures: for
instance, employing (purchasing) professionals who areresponsible for selecting preferred consultancies, coordinating
consultancies within the company, and maintaining the pool.
Therefore, if these expenditures exceed the calculated costs saved
by establishing PSPs for consulting services (e.g., reduced daily
consulting fees), it is unfavorable for companies to establish PSPs.
We argue that infrequent users of consulting services are
particularly sensitive to this rationale, since they scarcely benefit
from reduced consulting rates but have to bear all costs of the
program. Moreover, we argue that they scarcely benefit from
reduced transaction costs. As argued above, the initial establish-
ment of a pool of preferred consultancies involves high transac-
tion costs that amortize the longer and more intensively the
preferred consultancies are used. However, if companies infre-
quently use consulting services, it is likely that the costs involved
in establishing PSPs are higher than the program’s benefits (Werr
and Pemer, 2007). For instance, Williamson (1981) argued that
the more frequently a transaction recurs, the lower the level of
transaction costs is. Therefore, we argue that establishing PSPs for
consulting services might be unfavorable for infrequent users of
consulting services.
Proposition 3. The less frequently companies use consulting ser-
vices, the less likely is the establishment of PSPs for consulting
services.
4.2. Differences regarding selection criteria for consultancies
between companies with and without PSPs for consulting services
Our second research question investigated whether companies
with PSPs for consulting services differ from companies without
this mechanism in regard to selection criteria for consultancies.
Regarding the attached significance to selection criteria when
purchasing consultancies, we found no differences between
companies with and without PSPs for consulting services. Both
types of companies attached a high degree of significance to
relational criteria such as personal relations and recommenda-
tions by a third party. At first glance, the finding is surprising, as
one might expect that purchasing professionals would attach
greater significance to more formal selection criteria such as
‘‘price/performance ratio’’ or ‘‘industry expertise of the consul-
tancy’’ than individual managers in companies without PSPs
(Bäcklund and Werr, 2005; Werr and Pemer, 2007). However,
we argue that using formal selection criteria is rather difficult in
the case of consulting services. Smeltzer and Ogden (2002) found
that even purchasing professionals characterize the purchasing of
services as complex (see also Ellram et al., 2004). We argue that
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First, consulting services share general characteristics of services,
such as intangibility, which makes it harder for clients to make a
selection based on quantifiable criteria (Clark and Salaman, 1998;
Smeltzer and Ogden, 2002). Clients cannot be certain whether
they have made the right choice, as it is practically impossible to
measure the quality of the service a particular consultant offers in
advance. Second, the lack of a formalized body of knowledge in
respect to consulting—as is common for professions like account-
ing (Lowendahl, 2000)—further increases these difficulties. For
instance, since anyone can claim to be a ‘‘consultant’’ (Glückler
and Armbrüster, 2003), clients are limited in their ability to assess
consultants’ qualifications in the pre-purchasing stage. These
uncertainties increase clients’ ex ante transaction costs when
purchasing management consultants (Glückler and Armbrüster,
2003). To reduce ex ante and ex post transaction costs, managers
as well as purchasing professionals attach a high degree of
significance to relational selection criteria. For instance, selecting
consultancies based on their reputation reduces transaction costs,
since reputation produces trust and reduces clients’ needs for
safeguards in and after a transaction (Bergh et al., 2010). Simi-
larly, selecting consultants based on recommendations by third
parties reduces transaction costs, since network trust reduces
clients’ perceived risk of suppliers’ opportunistic behavior
(Glückler and Armbrüster, 2003), which reduces the need for
controlling consultancies. Additionally, bargaining costs and costs
related to resolving disputes are lower if client and consultant
have previously worked together, since contracts and agreements
from prior projects can be used in new projects too.
Proposition 4. Companies with and without PSPs for consulting
services attach a high degree of significance to relational selection
criteria to reduce ex ante and ex post transaction costs.
4.3. Do companies with PSPs for consulting services differ in the
(de)centralization of the purchasing process?
Our third research question investigated whether companies
with and without PSPs for consulting services differ in the
centralization of the purchasing of consulting services. Our find-
ings reveal that in companies with PSPs, the purchasing depart-
ment is more involved in the process of managing consulting
services, particularly with regard to the selection process and the
coordination of consulting projects. This finding indicates a
rethinking of the purchasing of professional services, since pre-
vious studies stressed that firms often purchase them without the
involvement of the purchasing department (see e.g., Axelsson and
Wynstra, 2002; Ellram et al., 2004; Smeltzer and Ogden, 2002).
The involvement of the purchasing department in the selection
process can be explained by the importance of this stage in the
purchasing process (van der Valk and Rozemeijer, 2009). Since
estimating a consultancy’s quality is difficult because of the
uncertainties involved in consulting services (Glückler and
Armbrüster, 2003; Mitchell et al., 2003), selection decisions are
particularly complicated. Although purchasing professionals also
characterize the purchasing of services as being rather complex,
they are nevertheless more experienced and are likely to have
more information about suppliers of consulting services than
managers (Karjalainen, 2011; Mitchell, 1994). Therefore, the
decision quality is presumably higher if the decision is made by
purchasing professionals. Additionally, the early involvement of
purchasing professionals in the purchasing process might reduce
the risk of selecting unqualified consultants or managers’ ‘‘pre-
ferred consultants’’. Previous research indicated that managers
tend to assign consultants that promote managers’ careers
instead of those that are best for companies (Höner and Mohe,2009; Karjalainen and van Raaij, 2011; Werr and Pemer, 2007).
Hence, the involvement of purchasing professionals in the selec-
tion stage might reduce ex post transaction costs related to the
risk of opportunistic behavior by managers. Although most
research focused on inter-firm opportunism and resulting trans-
action costs (see e.g., Wathne and Heide, 2000), we argue that
intra-firm opportunism also causes significant transaction costs
for companies, which further stresses the need for reducing them.
Proposition 5. Companies with PSPs for consulting services centra-
lize the selection process to reduce transaction cost related to risk.
The involvement of purchasing professionals in the coordina-
tion of consulting projects can be explained by high cost-saving
potentials. Given the case that two departments have similar
problems and independently from each other buy from two
different consultancies to solve their problems, it is likely that
the company’s costs increase, since synergy effects do not come
into play (Mohe, 2005). By involving purchasing professionals in
such coordination tasks, companies might better realize synergy
effects (e.g., if findings from a consulting project in one depart-
ment can be transferred to another department) and reduce the
risk of paying double for the same project (Mohe, 2005).
Proposition 6. Companies with PSPs for consulting services centra-
lize the company-wide coordination of consulting projects to reduce
costs and to realize synergy effects.
4.4. The influence of PSPs for consulting services on problems in the
purchasing process
The fourth research question investigated the influence of PSPs
for consulting services on the assessment of problems associated
with the purchasing of consulting services. The findings indicate
no difference between purchasers in companies with and without
PSPs for consulting services. This is surprising, since we would
expect that trained purchasing professionals, who are likely to
manage the purchasing in companies with PSPs, assess problems
in the purchasing of consulting services as being less severe than
do untrained managers. However, prior studies found that even
trained purchasing professionals find it hard to specify services,
define the content of a service level agreement, and evaluate
performance (Smeltzer and Ogden, 2002; van der Valk and
Rozemeijer, 2009) because of service characteristics such as
intangibility and inseparability (Clark and Salaman, 1998). For
instance, although purchasing professionals might have had
several experiences with suppliers of consulting services, it
remains difficult for them to assess quality and to make informed
decisions, so they are confronted with problems similar to those
found by managers who have less experience in purchasing.
Proposition 7. The particular characteristics of consulting services
(e.g., intangibility and inseparability) reduce the influence of PSPs on
lowering the uncertainties experienced by managers and purchasing
professionals when dealing with consultants.
An alternative explanation for the finding is that PSPs for
consulting services might not intend to address all problems in
the purchasing process. Problems such as the evaluation of
consulting services or the definition of the contract assignment
do not necessarily fall into the scope of PSPs for consulting
services. Moreover, firms can look at contracting and evaluating
services not only as problems when dealing with consultancies,
but also as part of the solution. For instance, problems such as
performance evaluation might be reduced if performance apprai-
sals are specified in the contracting stage (Axelsson and Wynstra,
2002). Specifying a project goal such as improving productivity by
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(van der Valk and Rozemeijer, 2009).5. Conclusion
5.1. Research implications
Our study has several implications for research on consulting
services and on PSPs. Regarding the literature on the purchasing
of consulting services, our study indicates that the current focus
on the client-consultant relationship—i.e., the relationship
between consultants and managers (see e.g., Fincham, 1999;
Werr and Styhre, 2002)—might be too narrow and should be
extended to the interaction between purchasing professionals and
consultants, and between purchasing professionals and managers.
We argue that the purchasing professional–consultant–manager
relationship might present a so-called service triad (see e.g., Choi
and Wu, 2009a, b; van der Valk and van Iwaarden, 2011): the
purchasing professional represents the buyer, while the consul-
tant, as subcontractor, delivers the services directly to the
manager, who is the end customer. This new perspective might
have significant implications for research. For instance, service
triads indicate that purchasing professionals lack control over
service delivery and service quality, since they are detached from
the service (van der Valk and van Iwaarden, 2011); only managers
are able to evaluate the service. Moreover, consultants are
confronted with two principals (purchasing professionals and
managers), which might complicate service delivery, since the
two principals do not necessarily pursue the same goals (Höner
and Mohe, 2009; Werr and Pemer, 2007). Furthermore, we extend
the literature on clients’ selection criteria for providers of con-
sulting services. While prior studies provided insights into com-
panies’ selection criteria (Corcoran and McLean, 1998; Dawes
et al., 1992), we additionally reveal that the involvement of
purchasing professionals in the purchasing of consulting services
does not significantly influence selection criteria. This finding
questions prior studies that indicated that the involvement of
purchasing professionals might lead to a formalization of the
purchasing process and to the use of formalized selection criteria,
in contrast to relational ones (Bäcklund and Werr, 2005; Werr and
Pemer, 2007). Moreover, we extend prior studies (Werr and
Pemer, 2007) by showing that the involvement of purchasing
professionals is limited to some crucial parts of the purchasing
process (e.g., selection of consultancies). Thereby, we provide
evidence that although the involvement of purchasing profes-
sionals increased, managers still have at least some control over
the purchasing of consulting services, which supports findings
from prior studies (Höner and Mohe, 2009; Lindberg and
Furusten, 2005). Additionally, our study indicates the applicability
of transaction cost theory to clients’ purchasing decisions regard-
ing consulting services. Although transaction cost theory has
received considerable attention in the purchasing literature (see
e.g., Dabhilkar, 2011; Ellram et al., 2008), research on the
purchasing of consulting services has so far been rather atheore-
tical, with few studies explicitly explaining their findings with
insights from theories such as transaction cost theory (for excep-
tions, see e.g., Armbrüster, 2006; Glückler and Armbrüster, 2003).
Our study provides evidence that transaction cost theory offers
important insights into companies’ purchasing practices when
buying consulting services. For instance, the theory could provide
explanations for differences in the purchasing of consulting
services between larger and smaller companies (Werr and
Pemer, 2007).
Furthermore, our findings also contribute to the literature on
PSPs. First, we extend research on PSPs by focusing on suchprograms for business services, in this case consulting services. As
our study indicates, PSPs for consulting services are established in
almost 44 percent of the respondent companies, which indicates
that purchasing research is well advised to start focusing on PSPs
for business services. Second, our results support previous studies
(Gosling et al., 2010; Ruben et al., 2007) that argued that
(transaction) cost considerations influence companies’ decisions
for implementing PSPs, thereby indicating that findings from PSPs
for goods can be—at least to some extent—transferred to PSPs for
business services.
5.2. Managerial implications
Our study has several implications for managerial practice.
Although actors in the capital market might pressure companies
to reduce their spending on business services such as manage-
ment consulting, our study has shown PSPs as only a part of the
solution. Since these programs entail significant investments in
the supplier base as well as efforts to build up such programs,
they are not profitable for infrequent purchasers of consulting
services. Additionally, our study also has practical implications for
consultancies. PSPs might seriously impact consultancies’ busi-
ness, since companies might demand the reduction of consulting
fees from their preferred consultancies in exchange for contin-
uous assignment. For consultancies, this might force a decision on
whether joining a PSP is a strategic option that generates
acceptable profits or it is beneficial for them to lose a client—in
the worst case—but to sustain a higher level of consulting fees.
5.3. Limitations
The generalizability of our findings is constrained by at least
three factors: (1) we surveyed only German companies, (2) we
surveyed companies with turnover of more than h1 billion, and
(3) we investigated PSPs for a special kind of professional service,
i.e., management consulting. Regarding the first factor, we have
no data to control for whether our findings are particular to
German companies. However, findings from case studies on
Swedish companies identified similar approaches (Werr and
Pemer, 2007), which indicate that the findings might be, to some
extent, generalizable for similar national cultures. Second, since
we have no data about PSPs for consulting services in smaller
companies, we do not know the applicability of our findings to
them. Though, we argue that it is unlikely that smaller companies
have established such programs, since even in our sample of
companies with a turnover of at least h1 billion, companies have
indicated that their consulting expenditures were not high
enough to justify such programs. Third, we argue that the findings
are to some extent applicable to other business services, since
PSPs can also be observed for other suppliers of business services.
For instance, some large companies such as DuPont reduced the
number of their law firms by about 90% in the 1990s (Reisinger,
2011). Although we have no further insights into companies’
reasons for that, we argue that it is likely that their reasons are
quite similar to those of the companies in this study, since
purchasing law services and consulting services incurs high risks
for companies (Mitchell, 1994).
Additionally, the findings of our study might be influenced by
the fact that we interviewed one contact person per company,
which could introduce a ‘‘key informant bias’’ (Kumar et al.,
1993). We recommend that subsequent studies gather informa-
tion from several persons in the same company to capture a
broader and therefore more accurate picture of potentially dif-
ferent attitudes towards dealing with consultancies. Additionally,
we lack data about our respondents, so we cannot identify for
certain who responded to our survey (e.g., managers, users of
Table A1
How many employees did your
company include in the last
financial year?






More than 100,000 employees
J. Sieweke et al. / Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management 18 (2012) 123–136134services, or purchasing professionals). This limits our findings,
since we cannot analyze, for instance, to what extent purchasing
professionals’ assessment of problems when dealing with con-
sultancies differs from that of other users of consulting services.
However, since we identified and personally contacted every
respondent, most of them working in purchasing departments,
we assume that our respondents had sufficient expertise in the
purchasing of consulting services.What was the total turnover of your
company in the last financial year?






More than 75.0 billion euro











Has your company already
established a program for preferred
management consultancies? [Note for
respondents: This program might
comprise master agreements with
management consultancies, as well as
a limited pool of consultancies from
which the managers have to choose]
Yes
No
Planning to do so in the future
What were the main motives of your
company for establishing a program
for preferred management
consultancies? (Seven-point Likert
We aimed to lower costs
We aimed to ensure that personal
relations between managers and
consultants would no longer influence5.4. Future research
Our study has several implications for future research. First,
we know little about the degree to which PSPs for consulting
services are accepted in practice. As Höner and Mohe (2009) have
shown in their case study within a large German company,
managers are likely to bypass centralized approaches to dealing
with management consultancies (see also Lindberg and Furusten,
2005). Therefore, it would be interesting to see whether and
under which conditions PSPs for consulting services are accepted
by managers and whether the establishment of PSPs hinders
managers from selecting their preferred consultancy (Bäcklund
and Werr, 2005; Lindberg and Furusten, 2005). Second, since our
study focused on the client’s side, we have no knowledge about
consultants’ reactions to PSPs. For instance, it would be worth-
while to analyze which strategies consultancies apply to cope
with this rather new situation or how consultancies try to bypass
these programs to enhance their competitive position. Probing
such issues might provide insights into the question of how
consultancies adapt to new environmental situations, such as
the introduction of PSPs. Third, further research on the purchasing
professional-consultant-manager relationship is recommended to
explore the implications of this service triad (Choi and Wu,
2009a; van der Valk and van Iwaarden, 2011).scale: 1 ¼ strongly disagree, 7 ¼
strongly agree)
the selection
We had a positive experience of
similar programmes in other
departments
Why did your company not establish a
program for preferred management
consultancies? (Seven-point Likert
scale: 1 ¼ strongly disagree, 7 ¼
strongly agree)
The coordination and maintenance of
the pool is too cost-intensive
Our expenditure on consulting
services is not high enough
Our managers insist on their
responsibility to identify the demand
for consulting services
Our managers insisted on being
involved in the selection process
Our managers insisted on their
responsibility for handling the5.5. Concluding remarks
In sum, our study suggests that researchers need to consider
PSPs when analyzing the purchasing of consulting services.
Although companies with and without PSPs for consulting ser-
vices share many similarities, e.g., they attach similar significance
to selection criteria for providers of consulting services, compa-
nies’ purchasing approaches significantly differ. Moreover, we
expect that the relevance of PSPs will grow, since an increasing
number of companies are likely to establish such programs for
consulting services in response to greater cost pressures.budget allocated to the purchase of
consultants
How many consultancies does your
preferred supplier program for
management consultancies include?
[to be filled in by the respondent]
Please indicate if the following
dealings with management
consultancies are centralized or
decentralized in your company:
(1 ¼ centralized, 2 ¼ decentralized)
[Note for respondent: centralized ¼
handled by a department;
Definition of contract assignment
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Please indicate how important the
following selection criteria are in your
company when the services of a
management consultancy are
Positive experience from former
projects
Industry expertise of the consultancy
Reputation of the consultancyAppendix A
The original questionnaire was written in German. The present
questionnaire has been translated by the authors.
See Table A1.
Table A1 (continued )
purchased (seven-point Likert scale: 1
¼ strongly disagree, 7 ¼ strongly
agree):
Price/performance ratio
Personal relation to the consultancy
Recommendation by a third party
Please indicate the significance of the
following problems as experienced
by organizational members, who
are responsible for the purchasing
and dealing with management
consultancies (seven-point Likert
scale: 1 ¼ unimportant, 7 ¼ very
important):
Definition of contract assignment
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